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I examine the impact of IMF credit use and its conditions on economic growth performance in 12 
South African countries over a period of 1999-2019. The work adopts an empirical and 
quantitative approach to analyzing the relationship between the GDP per Capita, the use of IMF 
Credit, Government Final Consumption Expenditure, Net Domestic Credit and Current Account 
balance. These variables are the most recommended in the IMF conditionalities during the 
lending arrangements with SADC members.  
The study uses Fixed-effect approach to evaluate how the use of IMF program and the conditions 
imposed directly affects economic growth. A dummy variable is included to evaluate GDP 
growth if a country met or not the imposed condition. The result from the analyses concludes 
that overall, the use of IMF credit has no statistical significance on the economic growth. But 
when some conditions are met, the GDP responds positively. Other variables current account, 
government expenditure, and net domestic shows significant and positive change on the GDP 
growth of SADC countries.  
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1.1Background of the study 
The IMF loan programs has been more popular in recent decades. More nations, mainly 
developing countries, have been participating in the loan program. As the participation in IMF 
programs has greatly expanded, there has been a vigorous debate about the efficacy of such 
participation in achieving the desired economic outcomes. One of the most asked question 
regarding IMF loan and economic growth is if countries truly benefit from access to IMF loan 
programs or would it be better if these programs did not exist? 
In theory, the IMF program should promote economic growth both directly and indirectly, for 
several reasons. First, IMF loans has inflexible conditions attached to them, for instance, 
implementing fiscal austerity or changing the monetary policy. The disbursement of IMF funds 
only take place if the borrowing country agree to the conditions imposed. Following IMF’s 
advice and accepting the conditionality should have similar effects: improved policy making and 
higher growth in the future, which leads them to increase their consumption, thus boost the 
growth. Further, the IMF gives policy advice during economic crises. This advice should help 
improve the economic climate and thus foster growth in the future. Finally, the loan from IMF 
helps alleviate financial constraints that the borrowing countries face and should stimulate their 
economies. In this research, the focus is to determine the effects of IMF’s lending and 
conditionalities and evaluate the met conditions on poverty reduction and growth facilities 
program for SADC countries’ economic growth while also considering the role and influences of 




1.2 Research question  
This research aims at finding answers to the following questions:  
I. Do the IMF loans influence economic growth in developing countries? 
II. Do the policies or conditions imposed on IMF loans influence the economic growth of 
the borrowing countries?  
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The major objective of this study is to empirically test if the IMF loans and its imposed 
conditions have favorable or non-favorable impact on the economic growth of SADC countries. 
This research will need to look at the channels through which these IMF loans and conditions are 
spent, whether these channels are drivers to growth of the economy. If the result of this study 
establishes that the funds program has had a positive impact on the growth of the economy, then 
I will further suggest more ways to enhance the efficiency of the Program. However, if the 
findings of this research assert unfavorable relationship between the fund and the drivers of 
growth, then I will further look at the reasons for this negative effect. It is hoped that the results 
of this work could be used by the policymakers of SADC countries on programs that will 
enhance their objectives of borrowing and committing to IMF loan conditions.  
1.4 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis to be tested for this study are: 
H0: IMF loans impact the GDP in SADC countries 
H1: IMF loans do not impact the GDP in SADC countries 
H0: The conditions imposed by IMF impact the growth of GDP in SADC countries 
H1: The conditions imposed by IMF does not affect the growth of GDP in SADC countries 
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1.5 Justification and Scope of the study  
Over the years the IMF has come under strong criticism and attack. With some even arguing that 
the IMF takes away the freedom and of the developing countries through its lending programs. 
Some has alleged that the lending and conditionalities is a ‘bait’ towards the trapping to an 
unending stream of national debt.  
Although there are numerous research done on developing countries, usually the researched 
countries lack strong similarities on social and economic situation. Therefore, taking inspiration 
from Dreher (2004) and Barro and Lee (2003), this research on the IMF and its relationship will 
focus solely on southern regions of Africa with countries that share similar social and economic 
system. This study will contribute to the already existing research of IMF and growth, but it will 
make a greater impact on the SADC countries because there is still shortage of research of the 
IMF programs that focus solely on the economic conditions of this region.  
1.6 Organization of the Study 
The study is composed of four sections. Chapter one introduces the background to the study. The 
chapter two gives an overview about SADC countries and IMF and the relationship between 
both. Chapter three presents previous literatures on the studies of IMF lending conditionality and 
hypotheses. Chapter four discusses the methodology, the result of the empirical analysis 








2.0 Overview of IMF and SADC Countries 
2.1 IMF History and Structure  
The IMF and the World Bank established in 1945, are products of the Bretton Wood conference 
which was planned by the USA and The Great Britain with the aim to establish an International 
monetary system with paper currencies as its base. The US dollar served as the anchor of the 
system, whiles the gold remains its source of value. With a membership of 190 countries, its 
initial role was to aid member countries that have exhausted their foreign exchange reserve and 
have trade deficit. The IMF serves as a lender of last resort to countries who are unable to 
borrow from the external financial markets when the country is facing difficulties with its 
external payments. The highest unit governing body is the Board of Governors. They are the 
highest decision-making body of the IMF (IMF, 1993). They are made of one governor and one 
alternate governor representing each member country. The governor is usually the minister of 
finance or can be the head of the central bank and is appointed by the member countries. The 
Figure 3 in appendix indicates the structure of the IMF. Voting process by the Board of 
Governors is done by Mail-in-ballot. The duties of the board of Governors consist of appointing 
executive directors, approval of quota increases for members’ countries, admit new members, 
allocates Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and take care of the amendments of by-laws and 
articles of agreements (IMF, 2013). 
2.2 Quotas and SDR 
The IMF is a quota-based institution. Quotas are the financial and governance pillar of the IMF. 
For the IMF to effectively carry out its mandate each member contributes a deposit called 
“quota”; the amount of quota a country contributes shows its size in the world economy. The 
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initial determinant for a country’s loan size is its quota contribution. Also, the quota determines 
the maximum amount of financial resources a country is obliged to contribute. Furthermore, the 
quota contribution is the key determinant for the voting power in IMF decisions. The higher the 
quota, the more power. According to IMF (1993), Votes comprises SDR 100,000 of quota plus 
basic votes (same for all members). Finally, quota determines a member’s share of general 
allocation of SDR.  
The Special Drawing Rights (SDR) which is an international reserve asset that function as IMF 
unit of account (IMF, 2020), determines the quotas. SDR is not a currency nor a country’s claim 
on the IMF, but it is a potential claim on the freely usable currencies of the IMF members. The 
currencies are the US Dollars, Euro, Chinese Yuan, Japanese Yen, and Pound sterling. The 
determination of the SDR Value in terms of the US dollars is done on daily basis, according to 
the spot exchange rates observed around London noon time (IMF, 2018). The SDRs are allocated 
in two different forms: General and Special. In 2009, countries who joined the IMF after 1981 
had a Special one-time allocation, after previous allocation was made on in the SDR system on 
equitable basis. The SDR operates in a form self-financing mechanism and levies charges on 
allocations which are then used to pay interest on SDR holdings. SDR can be traded by members 
in the voluntary market. Moreover, based on requirements the IMF can also designate members 
to buy SDRs.  
2.3 IMF Lending and Programs Design 
The IMF lends through a series of concessional and non-concessional arrangements. 
Concessional arrangements are loans that pays rates similar to the market loans while non-
concessional borrowing is defined as loans that offers more generous terms than market loans. 
(Ames et al, 2001). The IMF has an Executive Board in every member country. Through them, a 
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lending arrangement, which works like a line of credit is approved to support a country’s 
adjustment program. The arrangement demands that the recipient country should observe 
specific terms, which are subject to periodic reviews to continue to draw upon it.  
Furthermore, the recipient country has the responsibility of selecting, designing, and 
implementing policies to make the IMF-supported program successful. According to IMF 
department of Finance, the program is described in a letter of intent, which often has a 
memorandum of economic and financial policies attached (2017). The program’s objectives and 
policies depend on a country’s prevailing circumstances. But the most important goal is to 
restore, maintain and correct the Balance of payments viability and macroeconomic stability.  
The IMF’s program design comprises different types of arrangements or loan, depending on the 
borrowing country needs. For the scope of this study, the focus lays on Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF) which is the most used programs on developing countries. The PRGF 
program was founded in September 1999 with the objectives of making poverty reduction efforts 
on low-income members of the IMF. Through PRGF, IMF adopted principles to promote the full 
use of external aid while maintaining macroeconomic and debt sustainability 
The PRGT program includes the following arrangements: Extended Credit Facility (ECF), Rapid 
Credit Facility (RCF), and the Stand-by arrangement (SBA). The ECF was created to make the 
Fund’s financial support more flexible and better tailored to the diverse needs of the low-income 
countries, including in times of crisis (Lane and Phillips, 2002). The ECF is the IMF’s main 
vehicle for giving medium-term support to low-income countries with Balance of payments 
problems. The Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) is given to members experiencing urgent balance of 
payments need. The fund support under RCF carries zero interest rate and limited conditionality. 
The Stand-By arrangement (SBA) unlike ECF is an arrangement used by middle income 
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countries as well. It responds quickly to members’ external financing needs and support policies 
that help borrowing country to recover from crisis and restore sustainable growth.  
2.4 IMF Conditions and Reviews  
There are conditions which covers the design of IMF-supported programs, they are mostly 
macroeconomic, structural, fiscal and monetary policies (Dreher, 2004). Performance in these 
areas serves as the specific tools which are used to monitor the progress of the recipient countries 
toward the goals outlined in the cooperation with the IMF Executive board. Moreover, the 
conditionalities help borrower countries to solve their Balance of Payments problems without 
needing to resort to ways and policies that are harmful to the nation both domestically and 
internationally. At the same time, the measures are meant to serve as a form of insurance for the 
IMF, by ensuring that the imposed conditions on the borrowing country will be favorable enough 
for them to repay the loan and its interest by the due date (Joyce, 2004).  
The IMF uses three main tools to review, assess, and monitor borrowers’ compliance. The 
Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPCs) is a tool that relates to macroeconomic variables such 
as fiscal balances, external borrowing, international reserves, and monetary and credit 
aggregates. Through this assessment, IMF review if the borrower met the minimum level of 
federal government primary balance, the minimum level of international and ceiling on 
government borrowing. The Indicative targets (ITs) tool is also set to track quantitative 
indicators as QPCs, however, the ITs works better in capturing results on the face of uncertainty 
about economic trends. ITs monitor performance of borrowers’ commitment in meeting the 
minimum domestic revenue collection and level of social assistance spending. Last, the 
Structural Benchmarks (SBs) which performs a different role as the other tools. SBs are non-
quantifiable tool that measures borrowers’ economic reforms. The SBs focuses on measuring if 
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the country is improving financial sector operations, building up social safety nets, and/or 
strengthening public financial management.  
2.5 SADC creation and Political History 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is an economic block comprised of 16 South 
African countries founded in 1992. However, SADC originated in the 1960s and 1970s under the 
name of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in Lusaka with only 
nine countries members. SADC primary objective is the integration of economic development 
among southern African nations. This development achievement pan consists of reduction of 
members state dependence, mobilization of the members’ resources to promote the 
implementation of national, regional, and interstate policies, to establish relation to create 
genuine and equitable regional integration, and finally action to secure international cooperation 
within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation (SADC website). 






2.6 SADC and Poverty Reduction and Growth 
SADC countries have been experiencing positive population growth over the last three decades 
(Table 5, appendix). Growth in population implies that economies must grow rapidly to generate 
new employments at level that satisfy the need of the population and to reduce poverty. But the 
economy of SADC countries fails to follow the population growth pace which has been resulting 
in extreme poverty. 
According to Mapuva et al (2014), the poverty level in southern Africa continues to increase; 
about half of the population is living on less than $1 a day. In the hope to reduce the poverty 
level, these countries use IMF funding programs as resource, however, the result from the fund 

















3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 IMF and Economic Growth 
The IMF’s main goals is to promote growth. As the IMF former managing director Michel 
Camdessus, said in his statement at the United Nations Economic and Social Council in Geneva, 
on July 11, 1990: “Our primary objective is growth. In my view, there is no ambiguity about this. 
It is toward growth that our programs and their conditionality are aimed”. This statement 
reinforces the objective of IMF, which is economic growth. But over the years studies have 
shown opposite results compared to the primary goal of IMF. 
Economic growth can be defined simply as Economic expansion. The IMF’s Social Dimensions 
of the IMF’s Policy dialogue (1995), defines Economic growth has that “which brings lasting 
employment gains and poverty reduction, provides greater equality of income through greater 
equality of opportunity, including for women, and respects human freedom and protects the 
environment.” According to the IMF’s Policy Dialogue, growth is achieved on the following 
foundations: Macroeconomic policy, Social policy, Structural policy; and Good governance and 
Participatory Development. For the scope of this research, however, the focus is only in one 
aspect of the three Pillars of Economic growth as according to the IMF, which is the 
Macroeconomic Policy. 
3.1.1 The Negative impact of IMF lending on GDP growth 
The weight of evidence on the relationship between IMF loans and economic growth, has 
suggested more negative effect than positive. Barro and Lee (2003) studied the relationship 
between IMF loan and GDP growth for developing countries. The study was conducted using 
panel data for the period 1975 to 2000 using VAR approach. The results showed that higher IMF 
16 
 
loan participation rate reduces economic growth. In addition, the involvement in IMF loan 
programs decreases the investment level of the borrowing country and tends to lower the rule of 
law and democracy. They concluded that a country is better off economically without 
committing to be involved with IMF loans program. Dreher (2004) also established that the IMF 
programs were designed to enhanced growth, but they achieve the opposite. In his study using 
panel data for 98 countries, he found that IMF programs decrease growth rate when the 
endogeneity is accounted for further, weak evidence shows that compliance with the IMF 
conditionalities reduce this negative effect. Connors (1979) and Gylfason (1987) had also 
reported the same result of no economic growth impacted by the IMF loan.  
3.1.2 The positive impact of IMF lending on GDP growth  
Positive results were reported by Hackler et all (2018). In this study the authors used 93 
developing countries to analyze the direct effect of IMF loan condition compliance on GDP 
growth. The researchers selected a list of conditions imposed by the IMF for loan arrangements 
and used countries as the dummy variable to examine how compliance on conditions directly 
affects GDP growth. By using OLS method, the results suggests that real GPD growth rates are 
directly affected by the IMF loan when the imposed conditions are met. Conway (1994) 
reassessed the relationship between economic growth and IMF program by examining the 
performance of three macroeconomic measures: the real GDP per capita, fiscal surplus GDP, and 
current account. The estimation technique employed in the research included instrumental-
variable, and matching. The result from the panel data of 95 developing countries suggest that 





3.2 IMF and Poverty 
Poverty is an issue that numerous scholars continue to research because it is a phenomenon that 
represent challenges to eradicate. The World Development Report has defined Poverty as an 
unacceptable impoverishment and penury in human well-being that consist of both social and 
physiological deprivation. Poverty is a challenge that goes beyond economics, it also includes 
some other aspects of cultural, political, and social issues. In terms of physiological deprivation, 
it includes the lack of the basic material or biological needs, including improper education, 
inadequate health and nutrition, and lack of shelter.  
3.3 IMF and developing Countries  
The IMF constantly suffers heavy criticism about its programs with developing countries. Over 
decades several developing nations had been receiving loan from the IMF in the hope of 
reducing poverty rate and experience economic growth; however, the reality had been far from 
what IMF says is its objective, economic growth. Bird and Mosley (2004) made some important 
remarks concerning the IMF and the Developing countries in their book. Most of the remarks 
were from the report of the Meltzer Commission (the International Financial Institution Advisory 
Commission at the US Congress, 2000). According to Bird and Mosley (2004), Events and 
reforms have led the IMF into dealing with problems such as Poverty reduction and growth 
which they were not originally aiming at. Bird and Mosley further explains that the IMF through 
their conditional lending arrangement gives too little for the local and recipient country room to 
make credible and judicious long-term decisions on growth and Poverty reduction. Jonathan 
Sonnenberg (2018), in his famous article make 15 some important criticisms about how the IMF 
programs like the Poverty Reduction and Growth Fund and the HIPC has landed some African 
countries into a debt cycle. Sonnenberg (2018) makes a damning claim that the HIPC imitative 
of the Bretton Wood twins has contributed to an “extortive trend of debt-cycling”.  
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The IMF is mainly focused on making the conditions favorable for itself in the immediate 
medium term to regain its loans and the repayments. All the conditions are merely insurance 
cover for their lending and not as growth and poverty alleviation instruments as claimed. 
According to Meltzer commission, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) should be 
abandoned, and the IMF should rather focus on short-term crisis lending, for instance, the 
lending instrument given out during the Covid-19 crisis in the early quarters of the year 2020. 
Once more, the Meltzer Commission made some suggestions that the current conditionalities 
should be replaced by rather Fiscal and Financial requirements observed over some period of 
years. The IMF should focus on rather exchange rate policies, financial sector surveillance and 
monetary policies. According to Bird and Mosley (2004), the IMF should refrain from the So-
called structural adjustment conditionalities. Because of the conditionalities involved in the 
lending by the IMF, moral hazards are likely to happen, causing the innocent citizen of the 
recipient country to feel the effect. Hence, the aim of Poverty alleviation “backfires”, leading to a 














4.1 Sample and Data  
The study uses a sample of 12 countries with annual data covering the period from 1999 to 2019. 
Although SADC has 16 countries members, this research excludes four countries. South Africa 
is an outlier within SADC due to its economic development discrepancy compared to the rest of 
the members countries. The other three countries (Namibia, Seychelles, Mauritius) have data 
limitation. The dependent variable used in this study is the rate of GDP growth per capita. The 
Use of IMF credit as the main independent variable, and other explanatory variables include 
Current account balance as a percentage of GDP, Net Domestic credit, in place of Fiscal 
policy discipline, I used General Government final consumption expenditure as percent of 
GDP, Total investment as percent of GDP, and Average of governance indicators. The 
source of data used in this research are from the World Bank Development Indicator (WDI, 22), 
the World Economic Outlook, and the IMF annual Reports. The selected countries for this study 
are presented in the appendix, table 4.  
To fully measure the impact of the fund and the conditions on the borrowing country, the 
Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) was used. As explained on the IMF website, the 
MONA database contains comparable information on the economic objectives and outcomes in 
Fund-supported arrangements. It tracks the performance of countries in terms of scheduled 
purchases and reviews, quantitative and structural conditionality, and macroeconomic indicators. 
Data are available for most arrangements since 2002 to the present, and are collected at the time 




4.2 Variable Description  
 GDP per capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by the country’s population. GDP per capita 
properly captures the true value of prosperity in a country, and it is commonly used as a proxy of 
the initial conditions of a country in terms of development. This variable is used as dependent 
variable to capture the change in economic development over the years. 
 IMF Credit Usage (IMF credit) 
Use of IMF Credit data is related to the operations of the IMF and provided by the IMF 
Treasurer’s Department. They are converted from special drawing rights into dollars using end-
of-period exchange rates for stocks and average-over-the-period exchange rates for flows. The 
IMF credit usage is the right choice for this research because all its policy programs require 
ceilings on domestic credit creation and public spending (Bird 1998: 94). Relative to the World 
Bank, where noncompliance with conditionality normally takes years to monitor, the Fund’s 
conditions can be monitored after very few lags, this makes it easier to document 
noncompliance. (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1998: 68). The Use of IMF credit was originally in 
nominal terms, hence the 𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝑰𝑴𝑭credit, was estimated to arrive at the real value of the 
𝑰𝑴𝑭credit. The arguments surrounding the impact of IMF credit usage on GDP is complex and 
several studies came up with different conclusion.  
 Net Domestic Credit (NDC) 
According to World Bank World Development Index 2020, Net domestic credit is the sum of net 
claims on the central government and claims on other sectors of the domestic economy (IFS line 
32). It is the total sum of net credit given to the non-financial public sector, and credits offered to 
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the private sector, together with other accounts. Countries with high debt are likely to not benefit 
from the IMF fund’s credit usage.  
 Government Expenditure (GE) 
GE (% of GDP) represents government general expenditures; it includes all current expenditures 
for goods and services (compensation of employees, national defense, and security). The effect 
of GE on economic growth is ambiguous because its outcome depends on many factors and the 
economic situation at a given time. This variable is important in the process of IMF loans 
arrangements because it assess spending level of borrowing countries. 
 Current Account (CA) 
IMF defines the Current account as that which shows the flow of goods, services, primary 
income, secondary income between residents and non-residents. It is one of the main features of 
the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics.  
 Total Investment (TI) 
The collected data was the gross capital formation which also known as Investment. It includes 
capital expenditures in machinery and equipment dwellings, change in stocks and valuables 
(gold). Investment is believed to be one of the most important type of capital movement because 
it stimulates additional investment, which result in increase in GDP.  
 Governance Indicators (AvgGI) 
The governance indicators is composed of six dimensions of governance used to measure the 
quality of a nation’s government. The six dimensions are rule of law, political stability, 
government effectiveness, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, control of corruption. 
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Each one these indicators, if managed well, promotes development. For the scope of this paper, I 
averaged each indicator over the period of 1999-2018 and measured the relationship with GDP 
growth.  
4.3 Model Specification  
The models used on this research are specified as follow:  
Model 1: Effect of IMF credit Use in GDP growth:  
GDPper capitait = 0 + 1 LnIMFcreditit + 2 NDCit + 3 LnGEit + 4 CAit + 5 LnInvit + 6 
AvgGIit + it        
Model 2: Effect of IMF Conditions in GDP growth:  
GDPper capitait = 0 + 1 LnIMFcreditit + 2 Xit + 3Programit + 4 Met conditionXit+ it        
The first model is specified to capture the contemporaneous effect of IMF credit use on 
economic growth. The model 2 is an expanded formula of model 1. Assessing the performance 
of program countries without discriminating among them by their degree of compliance could 
give a misleading view of the effects of the IMF programs 
Therefore, the second model is focusing on direct impact of IMF conditions on GDP growth by 
looking at specific IMF program and the countries that have met IMF conditions imposed on this 
program. The B2Xt is a Vector of variables controlling for development which includes CA, 
NDC, Investment, and GE. I use two dummy variables; one specifies met conditions and the 
other the program type. Although IMF has numerous programs, this study is limited on the 
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) program because it is the most used program among 
SADC countries. The dummies are specified 1 if the country used PRGF program and 1 if met 
the conditions, otherwise it is zero.  
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The IMF conditions included in this model are the following: 
 1) Fiscal deficit (FD): the limit imposed on fiscal deficit of a country 
2) Balance of Payment (BoP): controlling medium and long-term debt to international 
creditors 
3) Ceiling on External arrears (CEA): controlling overdue debts and payments to 
domestic creditors  
4.3 Estimation Strategy 
The data used in this model consist of several cross-sectional values surveyed over time. This is 
also known as panel or longitudinal data. Panel data is considered to have more advantages than 
time series or cross-sectional data because it provides more information, efficiency, and 
variability. The appropriate estimation techniques for panel model are fixed and random effects, 
and pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS).  
The pooled OLS is the less complex method because it assumes that all the entities (countries) 
are the same and pools them together disregarding heterogeneities. This method has high risk of 
providing spurious regression results. However, Fixed Effect (EF) and Random Effect (RE) 
methods account for heterogeneities among entities being analyzed. Fixed effect approach takes 
into consideration the differences between individual entities and if the omitted variables are 
correlated. It is a preferred approach when analyzing the impact of variables that very over time. 
On the other hand, Random effect approach is preferred when variables on the model are 
constant over time. 
To determine whether to use Fixed Effect or Random Effect, the Hausman test was performed. 
The hausman test looks to see if there is a correlation between errors terms and the regressors in 
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the model. The null hypothesis states that there is no correlation. The results from the test reject 




4.4 Results and Discussion 
The results presented on table 2 explains the impact of the selected independent variables on 
GDP growth per capita. 
Table 2: Fixed-Effect results for IMF credit use 




    (9.381) * 
LnGE 2.749 
     (0.923) ** 
CA 0.125 
        (0.035) *** 
LnInv 4.209 







Number of countries 12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
The result shows no evidence of economic growth resulting from the use of IMF credit. For the 
scope of this study, it can be concluded that contemporaneous effect of IMF credit use is 
Table 3: Hausman Test 
Model P-value 
Direct IMF credit use 0.0127 
IMF Conditions  0.0398 
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insignificant on SADC countries’ GDP growth per capita. This result corroborates with 
Hutchison (2004) and Hardoy (2002). The insignificant result can be related to the fact that 
SADC countries typically enter into an agreement with the IMF only when facing terrible 
economic problems. One of the biggest criticisms on IMF is that it usually does not focus on the 
countries’ governance quality before making loan arrangements. The lack of understanding in 
the overall governance system of the borrowing country can result in the misallocation of the 
funding.  
As can be seen, most explanatory variables have the expected sign. Net domestic credit has a 
negative relationship with GDP growth. As domestic credit increases by 1%, the economy of 
SADC countries decreases by 1.58%. This result was expected because southern African 
countries lack a stable financial system. Evans (2013) study argues that one of the major’s 
implication in Africa’s economic growth is an inefficient financial system. The foundations for 
building sustained economic growth in SADC countries depends on the type of financial system. 
Considering institutional constraints, regulations, and other macro-economic factors working 
against domestic credit in the economy, SADC policymakers should make the environment 
conducive and supportive so that performance is enhanced, and good lending behavior is 
guaranteed.  
The increase in government expenditure leads to economic growth of 2.749%. This result is 
consistent with Barro (1999) who claims that the impact of government expenditure on economic 
growth is positive for the growing economies. SADC countries are developing economies, which 
means they are still in growth phase of economic life cycle. It is believed that increasing 
government expenditure is one of the ways the government can stimulate the economy. Thus, 
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increasing government spending through education, health care, and infrastructure is crucial for a 
string economy.  
Current account shows a strong positive relationship with GDP per capita. The significance level 
is 1% and goes in line with the expected results. As current account increases by 1%, the 
economy grows 0.125%. Although the magnitude of the increase is low, the current account and 
GDP is expected to move in the same direction.  
Total investment also shows a strong positive relationship with GDP per capita. The significance 
level of these two variables is 1% and goes in line with the expected results. An increase of 1% 
in total investment leads to 4.209% in economy growth. Several empirical studies have proven 
positive relationship between Investment and economic growth. Therefore, I expected a 
significant and positive results. High investment leads to an expansion of economic growth. By 
including property rights, it becomes possible for society to meet a higher productivity trading 
relationship and to enjoy the benefits of voluntary exchange (Grossman, 1988). 
The result on the relationship between the average of governance indicators and the GDP growth 
is quite surprising because it would be expected either a positive or negative relationship 
between these variables. However, what is not surprising is that southern African countries have 
low quality of governance. The lack of significance between these variables could be explained 
by what Vaubel (1983) refers to as “moral hazard hypothesis”. The idea behind this hypothesis is 
that the availability of IMF lending programs may be a boost for countries to deteriorate their 
economic policies to be eligible for more funds from the IMF. In the last two decades SADC 
countries, especially Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola, have been granted large sum of IMF 
funds but the quality of governance continues to deteriorate. Dreher (2005) argues that it is 
evident that the balance of payments problems of IMF borrowers has been caused by their own 
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and their macroeconomic performance has been deteriorating as the number of IMF loan 
programs increases.  
Table 3: Model 2- Fixed-Effect results for IMF Conditions 






    (0.927) ** 
CA 0.126 
        (0.034) *** 
LnInv 4.186 
















Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
The results from variables used on the model 1 are similar with the second model, except the net 
domestic credit that came out insignificant.  
Limit on Fiscal deficit is the only met condition while the conditions on Balance of Payment and 
Ceilings on External Arrears are insignificant. The loan program countries meeting the condition 
for Fiscal Deficit experienced a decrease in real GDP growth rates. The results suggest, with 
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90% confidence, that the fiscal deficit condition decreases a country’s real GDP growth rates by 
an average of 1.414%. According to Bird and Mosley (2004), the Fund’s conditionalities are 
ineffective. They argue that IMF uses the conditionalities and arrangements to exert to much 
coercion on the developing countries. This is in sync with Sonnenberg (2018) accusations. Bird 
and Mosley further explains that the IMF through their conditional lending arrangement gives 
too little for the local and recipient country room to make credible and judicious long-term 
decisions on growth and Poverty reduction. The IMF is only focused on making the conditions 
favorable for itself in the immediate medium term to regain it loans and the repayments 
Killick (1995) also gives evidence that highly indebted countries as well as countries with small 
amounts of IMF credit are less likely to complete a program and that fiscal conditions are 
especially unlikely to be met. He also stresses that new programs are approved for political 
reasons even if non-compliance with conditionality of previous ones is evident.  
2.0 Conclusion and Limitations  
The objective of this paper was to estimate the effect of the IMF lending on the economy of 
SADC countries. Together with this objective, was to also estimate the effect of most of the 
macroeconomic variables which matter in the IMF conditionalities in the lending out of the loan 
to these countries. Two fixed-effect models were applied to examine this relationship. A panel 
data for 12 countries from 1999 to 2019 were used in this study.   
As has been shown in several studies, with respect to this objective, IMF programs are a failure. 
The results attained from this research determines no significant effect on economic growth 
caused by IMF credit use. The results also showed that the condition imposed by the IMF 
program are insignificant, besides the fiscal deficit that showed low but significant impact on 
GDP growth of SADC countries.  
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This results from this study supports Hutchison (2004), Hardoy (2002) and many other research 
that the IMF is only focused on making the conditions favorable for itself in the immediate 
medium term to regain it loans and the repayments. From this results, policymakers of SADC 
should be more aware of the conditions imposed by the IMF during program loan arrangements.  
Every research work has its limitations. One of the challenges of this work was data availability. 
There was no data for three countries. In addition, the countries in this dataset likely have very 
different production structures and most IMF relief recipients in developing regions tend to have 
less accurate valuations of GDP relative to developed countries. Further, it is important to note 
that this research did not consider the lag of GDP. Therefore, some alterations could be made to 
the data to be able to draw more precise conclusions. Future research should investigate whether 
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Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 1999-2019 (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Observation 
GDPPC 1.78 4.20 -18.49 18.06 252 
IMFcredit 364 389 10253 1860 252 
NDC 1360 3650 -168 23600 252 
GE 21.74 11.68 2.04 60.37 252 
CA -4.40 10.59 -57.96 22.19 252 
INV 23.19 10.56 1.53 53.98 252 
GI -0.61 0.61 -2.10 0.89 252 
 
 
Table 5: Socio-Demographic- Population in SADC (2009-2019) 








2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Angola 22,099 22,802 23,533 24,292 25,080 25,901 26,681 27,503 28,359 29,250 30,175 
Botswana 1,951 1,988 2,025 2,063 2,101 2 156  2 195 2 230 2 155 2 303 2,339 
Comoros 669  687 705 724 744 764 785 806 828 851 851 
DRC 70 391  72 884 75 259 77 817 80 462 83 197 85 026 86 895 88 806 91 724 97,356 
Eswatini 1 044   1 055 1 067 1 080 1 093 1 106 1 119 1 132 1 093 1 120 1,134 
Lesotho 1 887  1 892 1 897 1 901 1 908 1 916 1 924 1 942 1 953 2 183 2,125 
Madagascar 19 601  20 142 20 696 21 263 21 842 22 434 23 040 23 658 24 290 25 680 26,969 
Malawi 13 520  13 948 14 389 14 845 15 317 15 805 16 311 16 833 17 373 17 564 18,629 
Mauritius 1 247  1 250 1 252 1 256 1 259 1 261 1 263 1 263 1 265 1 265 1,266 
Mozambique 21 803  22 417 23 050 23 701 24 366 25 042 25 728 26 424 27 864 28 586 29,318 
Namibia 2 103  2 143 2 116 2 155 2 196 2 238 2 281 2 459 2 369 2 414 2,459 
Seychelles 87 88 87 87 89 91 93 95 96 97 98 
South Africa 50 545  51 329 52 129 52 930 53 751 54 574 55 407 56 253 57 098 5793 58,775 
Tanzania 41 916  43 187 44 485 44 929 46 356 47 831 49 359 50 942 52 555 54 199 55,891 
Zambia 12 626  13 093 13 719 14 145 14 600 15 023 15 934 16 405 15 474 16 887 17,381 
Zimbabwe 12 231  12 336 12 754 13 062 13 368 13 652 13 944 14 240 14 745 15 27 15,573 
SADC Total 273,720     
 
281,241 289,163 296,251 304,532 312,992 320,630 328,608 337,254 347,334 360,339 
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Figure 2: IMF Organizational chart 
 
 
 
